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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
NEMET CHEVROLET LTD. and
THOMAS NEMET d/b/a NEMET
MOTORS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, INC.,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-254 (GBL/TCB)

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR STRIKE COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. and Thomas Nemet d/b/a Nemet Motors (“Nemet”)
hereby oppose the motion to dismiss or strike of Defendant Consumeraffairs.com on the grounds
that: Defendant’s motion is untimely and should not be considered absent proof of excusable
neglect; Defendant is an information content provider not subject to protection under the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”); Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages is
groundless and contrary to well-recognized Virginia Commonwealth procedures; and, Plaintiffs’
commercial interests have been injured by Defendant’s violations of the Lanham Act and
therefore have standing to sue.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Nemet, a group of franchised automobile dealers with over ninety years of
experience selling cars in the New York area, have an excellent reputation for fair dealing and
truthfulness. Compl. ¶ 10. Defendant Consumeraffairs.com operates a commercial website, that
misleadingly portrays itself as a “consumer affairs” website, but in reality solicits consumer
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complaints, funnels them to class action lawyers, and generates revenue from advertising.
Indeed, Defendant’s founder has admitted that advertising is the website’s sole source of income.
Compl. ¶¶ 11-14.
Defendant has admitted that every complaint submitted to the website is reviewed by
class action attorneys, who have filed “hundreds of cases” based on that review. Compl. ¶ 15.
One of Defendant’s contributing editors is a practicing plaintiffs’ attorney in Fairfax, Virginia.
Compl. ¶ 16.

Defendant’s website misleads consumers, diverting them from legitimate

consumer protection organizations and agencies, and operates in commerce by deriving revenue
from misrepresenting itself as a consumer website. None of the alleged complaints against
Plaintiffs that appears on Defendant’s website has been reported to the New York City
Department of Consumer Affairs (“NYCDCA”), the state agency actually charged with
protecting consumers where Plaintiffs’ business operates. Compl. ¶¶11-13.
Defendant, which does not contest personal jurisdiction, maintains an office in Virginia.
Subject matter jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction under the Lanham Act and 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a) and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and the facts
establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as well as based on complete diversity
between Plaintiffs and Defendant and the amount in controversy. Defendant has defamed Nemet
and tortiously interfered with Nemet’s business by publishing numerous false complaints.
Compl. ¶¶ 17-37, ¶¶ 38-45. In this regard, Defendant is doing far more to solicit, shape, and
steer the content of complaints than merely serving as an online forum. As a website that
promotes itself as a portal for potential consumer class action lawsuits, Defendant “empowers
consumers by providing a forum for their complaints and a means for them to be contacted by
lawyers if their complaints have legal merit.” Declaration of Thomas Nemet (“Nemet Decl.”) ¶

2
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8, Attach. A. Defendant states that they work with attorneys with consumer law expertise who
may contact people who post complaints to discuss potential legal remedies. Id.
Defendant instructs people who use the website how to refine and shape the content of
their complaints, in keeping with the website’s commercial goal of attracting advertising and
funneling complaints to class action lawyers. Defendant publishes original content, authored by
its editorial staff, that explains how class action lawsuits work, and how potential claimants can
find class action lawyers through consumeraffairs.com. Nemet Decl. ¶ 9, Attach. B. An article
on the website authored by Defendant’s contributing editor, Virginia attorney Joan Lisante,
explains that “to qualify as a class action, a lawsuit must affect a broad class of individuals, all
similarly harmed . . .”. Nemet Decl. ¶ 10, Attach. C.
Meanwhile, Defendant’s website contains original content authored by Defendant that
falsely casts Plaintiffs in a negative light to help attract more complaints. Defendant published
comments about Plaintiffs, clearly written by Defendant’s own editorial staff, that describe one
of their own employee’s efforts to “summarize everything that can go wrong when buying a car.”
Nemet Decl. ¶ 14, Attach. E. Defendant’s own content then states “[i]f we had paid more
attention to the complaints about Nemet Automotive Group of the airport-rich borough of
Queens, she might not have had to bother. The Nemet complaints pretty well cover the territory
-- everything from prices engraved in sand to advertising that overlooks certain crucial
elements.” Id. Defendant also states, in other original content published on the website, that
despite Plaintiffs’ long history in the automobile business, “some of Nemet’s customers aren’t so
impressed, as the complaints in this section indicate. A selection of assorted recent complaints
appears below, while categorized beefs are listed to the right.” Nemet Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D.
Consistent with Defendant’s original content that attacks Nemet’s alleged pricing and
advertising practices, Defendant’s website page for Nemet Motors categorizes complaints by
3
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specific categories designed to shape complaints so they are more appealing for class action
lawyers who work with the website to review complaints. Nemet Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, Attach. D. By
establishing specific categories on its website such as “changing prices,” “extended warranties,”
and “advertising,” reinforcing those categories with original editorial content authored by
Defendant, and advising website users that class actions require similar harm among many
parties, Defendant participates in creating the content of complaint by instructing users of the
website how to channel their complaints into broad classes, consistent with the original content
that Defendant authored and placed on its website to promote class action lawsuits. Nemet Decl.
¶ 13, Attach. D.
Additionally, at least two recent complaints about Plaintiffs that are posted on
Defendant’s website cannot be traced to any specific customer based on the name, address, and
make and model year of car provided. Nemet Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs believe these complaints
may have been authored by the Defendant in yet another effort to solicit certain types of
complaints and promote the website’s commercial purposes of attracting advertising (of which
advertisements by law firms are a significant part) and facilitating class action lawsuits. Id.
Plaintiffs also allege that they have been damaged by Defendant’s false advertising under
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A), for using the name “consumer affairs” in commerce
in a manner that is likely to cause confusion or deception about the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of Defendant’s services or commercial activities. Compl. ¶¶ 46-50. Finally, Plaintiffs
have been damaged by Defendant’s misuse of the name “consumer affairs” in a manner that is
likely to influence consumer purchasing decisions by deceiving consumers, including Plaintiffs’
customers. Compl. ¶¶ 51-56.
This matter appears before the Court on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss, the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are
4
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taken as true. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Otherwise, Jetform Corp. v. Unisys
Corp., 11 F.Supp.2d 788, 789 (E.D. Va. 1998), succinctly states the applicable legal standards:
Rule 12(b)(6) motions test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Randall v. United
States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, such motions “should be
granted only in very limited circumstances.” Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins.
Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
should be denied “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” De Sole v.
United States, 947 F.2d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Coakley & Williams,
Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir.1983)).
Generally, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must be assessed in light of
Rule 8’s liberal pleading standards. Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The complaint need
only state sufficient facts to enable the defendant to draft a responsive pleading.
5A Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure, § 1357.
In this case, Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration by Thomas Nemet that addresses
certain facts about Defendant’s website. The facts in this declaration need not be pleaded in a
complaint but should nonetheless be taken as true on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD DENY DEFENDANT’S
MOTION AS UNTIMELY

Defendant filed their motion outside the time authorized by the Rules and has not filed
the requisite motion averring excusable neglect. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
state that motions under Rule 12 must be filed “within 20 days after being served with the
summons and complaint.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). Generally, the time limits in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be enlarged if a request is made before the expiration of
the prescribed period, or “on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act
because of excusable neglect.” FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Moreover, the Local Rules provide
that after the complaint is filed, “all pleadings, motions, briefs, and filings of any kind must be
timely filed with the Clerk’s Office of the division in which the case is pending.” Local Civil
5
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Rule 7(H). Further, “[a]ny requests for an extension of time relating to motions must be in
writing and, in general, will be looked upon with disfavor.” Local Civil Rule 7(I).
Here Defendant filed after the deadline expired and without any request for enlargement
of time, much less a representation of excusable neglect.

Defendant was served with the

Complaint by hand on March 19, 2008, at its office in Fairfax. Declaration of Andrew Friedman
(“Friedman Decl.”) ¶ 5, Attach H. According to the Rules, Defendant’s answer or responsive
motion should have been filed no later than April 8, 2008. Defendant missed the deadline and
filed the instant motion on April 14, 2008 – without seeking an enlargement. Accordingly, the
Court should decline to consider Defendant’s motion and order Defendant to answer the
Complaint. Denial would not unfairly prejudice the Defendant, which could raise the same
issues in the future.
II.

INFORMATION CONTENT LIKE CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
A.

Defendant’s Motion Should Be Denied As Premature

Defendant’s motion is premature because the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230, establishes an affirmative defense that must be addressed on the merits after discovery,
not on a preliminary dispositive motion. Though courts may refer to the CDA as creating a sort
of immunity, the CDA does not block jurisdiction. “Rather, the CDA has created a broad
defense to liability. Whether or not that defense applies in any particular case is a question that
goes to the merits of that case….” Energy Automation Sys., Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38452, *40-41 (M.D. Tenn. May 25, 2007). In Energy Automation, the court
held that the issue of whether the CDA applied to the defendant’s conduct concerning the
plaintiff “requires a factual determination that is not appropriately made at this early stage of the
litigation. Ruling on that issue requires inquiry into a factual record that will not exist until the
parties have been afforded ample time to complete discovery.” Id. Like the plaintiff in Energy
6
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Automation, Nemet has submitted a declaration that disputes Defendant’s assertion of CDA
immunity and Defendant’s contention that it is an “interactive computer service.” See generally
Nemet Decl. ¶¶ 8-16. For this reason alone, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II under
the CDA should be denied as premature, and Defendant should be ordered to answer the
Complaint.
B.

Defendant Does Not Qualify for CDA “Immunity”

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Counts I and II should be denied because it is an
information content provider, therefore not qualified for the immunity under the CDA. The
CDA only protects providers or users of an “interactive computer service” from claims that
would hold service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). The statute defines an
“interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). As set forth
below, Defendant’s website is not an interactive computer service.
Rather, Defendant’s website, consumeraffairs.com, is an information content provider
that is not protected by the CDA. The statute defines an “information content provider” as “any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(3) (emphasis added). In considering whether a website is an information content
provider, courts evaluate whether the website participated, in whole or in part, in the creation or
the development of the information on the site. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 929 (9th Cir. 2007) (interactive roommate match service
7
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responsible, “by categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users’ profiles,” for
creating or developing information on website); Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusinessbureau.com,
L.L.C., 418 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1148-49 (D.Ariz. 2005) (denying CDA immunity for a purported
consumer reporting website); MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6678, *25-26 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (same); Energy Automation, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38452 (same). Defendant is engaged in precisely the type of content development and
channeling that eliminates immunity under the CDA, and is engaged in conduct similar to the
badbusinessbureau.com website that has repeatedly been denied the protections of the CDA.
The series of opinions rejecting CDA immunity, including a number of lawsuits against
the purported consumer website badbusinessbureau.com, are instructive because they identify
specific types of conduct that render a website an information content provider. Defendant
curiously has failed to cite or distinguish any of these highly relevant opinions. First, courts
have noted that encouraging and instructing consumers on how to draft complaints and gather
information goes beyond the traditional publisher role protected by the CDA, and constitutes
creating and developing the content of the complaints. MCW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678 at
*34 (“the defendants cannot disclaim responsibility for disparaging material that they actively
solicit”).

Applying similar logic, a court held that a website that solicited purchasers of

telephone records and purchased those records for resale participated in the creation or
development of the information, despite the fact that the phone records themselves were created
by third-parties, and was therefore denied immunity under the CDA for alleged unfair trade
practices. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74905, *15-16 (D.Wyo. Sept. 28,
2007).
Defendant undeniably instructs its website users how to craft complaints so they will be
more appealing to consumer class action lawyers. These instructions appear in original content
8
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authored by Defendant.

An article authored by Virginia lawyer and consumeraffairs.com

contributing editor Joan Lisante advises that “to qualify as a class action, a lawsuit must affect a
broad class of individuals, all similarly harmed . . .”. Nemet Decl. ¶ 10, Attach. C. To advance
Defendant’s goal of attracting complaints worthy of attention by consumer class action lawyers
for a potential lawsuit against Plaintiffs, various portions of the website that refer to the Plaintiffs
identify and reinforce specific categories of alleged misconduct by Plaintiffs – specifically,
disputes over pricing, advertising, and extended warranties. Nemet Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D.
Defendant admits that it forwards complaints to class action lawyers, for the purpose of having
the complaints reviewed for possible lawsuits – a very similar type of conduct cited in
Accusearch as the basis for finding the website was not protected by the CDA. By providing
guidance and channeling complaints against Plaintiffs into specific categories designed to attract
class action lawyers’ attention, Defendant is helping shape and develop the content of the
complaints.
Second, courts have focused on the fact that the consumer-oriented website created and
posted disparaging messages about a specific company. MCW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678 at
*32. Defendant cannot dispute that it creates original and highly disparaging content about the
Plaintiffs. One comment authored by Defendant concerns an employee’s quest to “summarize
everything that can go wrong when buying a car.” Nemet Decl. ¶ 14, Attach. E. The website
proceeds to falsely disparage Plaintiffs: “[i]f we had paid more attention to the complaints about
Nemet Automotive Group of the airport-rich borough of Queens, she might not have had to
bother. The Nemet complaints pretty well cover the territory -- everything from prices engraved
in sand to advertising that overlooks certain crucial elements.” Id. In the section of the website
specifically dedicated to Plaintiffs, a comment authored by Defendant belittles Plaintiffs’ long
and successful history in the automobile business, stating “some of Nemet’s customers aren’t so
9

Case 1:08-cv-00254-GBL-TCB Document 8 Filed 04/28/08 Page 10 of 24 PageID# 53

impressed, as the complaints in this section indicate. A selection of assorted recent complaints
appears below, while categorized beefs are listed to the right.” Nemet Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D.
The latter insulting remarks serve as an introduction to the defamatory complaints against
Plaintiffs, which appear immediately below the Defendant’s commentary – exactly the type of
heading or introduction that was critically important to the ruling against badbusinessbureau.com
in MCW.
Third, soliciting individuals to “submit reports with the promise that individuals may
ultimately be compensated for their reports” could support a finding that the website was
responsible for creating or developing information provided by people who respond to the
solicitation. Hy Cite, 418 F.Supp.2d at 1149; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Defendant’s
website trumpets the fact that every complaint submitted to the website is reviewed by class
action attorneys, who have filed “hundreds of cases” as a result of that review. Compl. ¶ 15.
This key factor distinguishes third-party submissions to comparatively passive websites like
AOL, MySpace, Ebay, and Yahoo, which generally implicate routine publisher functions like the
decision of whether to publish, edit, or withhold third-party content.

Here, Defendant is

participating in creating content by soliciting specific kinds of complaints with the promise of
potential compensation, in the form of a class action lawsuit recovery.
Fourth, websites that engage in “categorizing, channeling and limiting” information that
appears on the website are responsible, at least in part, for creating or developing the
information. Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 929. Defendant accomplishes this by listing
“categorized beefs” about Nemet on the website, such as pricing and advertising complaints, and
by reinforcing those categories in highly negative editorial comments about Plaintiffs. Nemet
Decl. ¶ 13, Attach. D. Viewing these actions in the context of a website that admits it packages
complaints for review by class action lawyers, the fact that Defendant ConsumerAffairs.com has
10
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created and reinforced specific categories of complaints about Nemet Plaintiffs plays a crucially
important role in shaping the content of the complaints. Indeed, Defendant Consumeraffairs.com
derives the most benefit from the class action lawyers who review the complaints, and advertise
on Defendant’s website, if the complaints fit into categories that satisfy the commonality
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
In conclusion, courts have consistently rejected CDA immunity for websites that
participate in creating content by shaping or developing third-party information posted on the
site. The allegations in the Complaint and in the Declaration of Thomas Nemet, both of which
extensively describe content posted on Defendant’s own website, make a compelling case for
finding that Defendant Consumeraffairs.com is an information content provider that does not
qualify for the immunity provisions of the CDA.
C.

Defendant Cites Cases Which Are Inappropriate.

The cases cited by the Defendant are all distinguishable. Defendant’s original content
and solicitation of complaints for the purpose of fueling class action lawsuits simply goes well
beyond the traditional editorial functions performed by websites like AOL, MySpace, and Ebay.
See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33 (traditional publisher role involves decision whether to
publish, edit, or withdraw a posting); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex.
2007) (traditional editorial function means deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or
alter content) (citations omitted). The case of Whitney Information Network Inc. v. Xcentric
Ventures, LLC, was decided on summary judgment, after the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s
particular allegations in that case were fully vetted in discovery. 2008 WL 450095, *7 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 15, 2008).

But see Accusearch, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74905 (rejecting CDA

immunity on a motion for summary judgment). More importantly, plaintiff Whitney did not
dispute that badbusinessbureau.com was an “interactive computer service,” while the Nemet
11
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Plaintiffs hotly dispute this contention and believe the Defendant is a non-immune information
content provider. Id. at *8.
The only court that has applied CDA immunity to a ‘consumer complaint’ website was
faced with completely different claims and arguments than Plaintiffs’ contentions this case, or
the claims and contentions addressed in other opinions that have denied CDA immunity. In
Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, plaintiff Global argued only that the defendant
refused to remove specific content and alleged only “minor participation” by the defendant in
composing the alleged defamatory messages. 2008 WL 565102, *3 (D.Ariz. Feb. 28, 2008). As
discussed, Defendant: authors and publishes original articles that guide website users on how to
effectively draft complaints that will interest class action lawyers; authors and publishes original
content in the form of highly negative opinions about the Plaintiffs, then solicits complaints;
repeatedly suggests specific categories of alleged misconduct for website users to focus on; then
promises that all complaints will be reviewed by class action lawyers, and that users of the
website may recover money as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiff Nemet’s Declaration states that
customers cannot be identified for at least two of the complaints against Plaintiffs, and that these
complaints were likely authored by Defendant’s editors to help solicit more complaints. Nemet
Decl. ¶ 16. This latter point clearly cannot be resolved without fact discovery.
III.

DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT AS TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IS MISPLACED
The Court should deny Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim

because Virginia law caps punitive damage awards, not the ability to claim punitive damages in
excess of the cap. Of course, it is axiomatic under Virginia’s law that neither a court nor a jury
may award punitive damages in excess of $350,000. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1. However, the
statute clearly acknowledges a party’s ability to claim punitive damages in excess of the cap, as
well as a jury’s power to determine that punitive damages exceeded the cap: “The jury shall not
12
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be advised of the limitation prescribed by this section. However, if a jury returns a verdict for
punitive damages in excess of the maximum amount specified in this section, the judge shall
reduce the award and enter judgment for such damages in the maximum amount provided by this
section.” Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia expressly endorsed this approach in an opinion
concerning Virginia’s medical malpractice damages cap: “A trial court applies the remedy’s
limitation only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function. Thus, Code § 8.01-581.15
does not infringe upon the right to a jury trial because the section does not apply until after a jury
has completed its assigned function in the judicial process.” Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 237
Va. 87, 96 (1989) (emphasis in original). Clearly, the statutory cap limits the amount of punitive
damages that can be awarded but does not affect the amount of punitive damages that can be
claimed in a complaint.
To the extent the two unpublished cases relied upon by the Defendant create any
confusion about how the damages caps actually operate in the courts of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, the text of the statute and Etheridge control on this issue of state law. See Faircloth v.
Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 517 n.9 (4th Cir. 1991) (federal courts generally bound by state court’s
interpretation of its own statutes); Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F.Supp. 1357, 1361-62 (W.D.
Va. 1979) (“The Virginia Supreme Court’s interpretation as to the import of its own law is
conclusive.”); Ferguson v. Manning, 216 F.2d 188, 188 (4th Cir. 1954) (“It is too well settled to
admit of argument that the federal courts are bound by the interpretation placed upon the statutes
of a state by its highest court.”). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages
claims should be denied.
IV

PLAINTIFFS ARE INJURED PARTIES WHO HAVE STANDING
TO SUE UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
D.

Constitutional Standing Is Undisputed

13
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Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs are injured parties entitled to standing under the
Constitution. Whether a party has standing “involves both constitutional limitations on federalcourt jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975). To establish constitutional standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an actual or threatened
injury (2) that was caused by the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d
786, 789 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
Defendant concedes that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged injury that was caused by
Defendant’s allegedly illegal conduct, or that a favorable decision would at partially remedy the
Plaintiffs’ injury. See Compl. ¶¶ 36-37.
E.

As a Party Injured in Commerce by Defendant’s Misleading Use of the Name
“Consumer Affairs,” Plaintiffs Have Prudential Standing to Sue Under the
Lanham Act

Plaintiffs have standing to sue under the plain language of the Lanham Act, the Fourth
Circuit’s approach to evaluating Lanham Act standing, and the approach used in most other
circuits. Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiffs must be a direct competitor to assert Lanham Act
claims is contrary to Fourth Circuit precedent and the facts of this case.
1.

The Language and Purpose of the Lanham Act Support Plaintiffs’
Standing to Sue in This Case

The Lanham Act does not restrict standing to competitors. Rather, it is meant “to protect
persons engaged in such commerce [as Congress may regulate] against unfair competition.” 15
U.S.C. § 1127. To this end, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which—

14
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(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added). It is well-settled that “[t]he starting point for any issue
of statutory interpretation…is the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d
453, 460 (4th Cir. 2007). The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the
“rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989) (citations and quotations omitted). This plain language does not prevent the Plaintiffs,
who are in the business of selling automobiles, from suing a website that posts false consumer
complaints and deceives consumers into thinking the complaints are the accurate, fact-checked
complaints posted by legitimate consumer protection agencies and organizations. Congress
easily could have limited standing to “competitors” rather than “any person,” but instead chose
to allow broad standing to assert Lanham Act claims.
Plaintiffs’ claims are also consistent with the overall remedial purpose of the Lanham
Act.

The Act is designed to provide a remedy for “all persons” who are victimized by

misleading and deceptive use of trade names, whether for unfair competition, false advertising,
or trademark or trade dress infringement. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658
F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (“§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act is remedial in nature, and should be
interpreted and applied broadly so as to effectuate its remedial purpose.”); Thorn v. Reliance Van
Co., 736 F.2d 929, 932 n.5, 933 (3d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the “widely-held view that as a
15
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remedial statute, [Section 43(a)] should be broadly construed,” and holding, “the mere fact that
Thorn is not a competitor of Reliance does not, in and of itself, preclude him from bringing suit
under section 43(a).”); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been characterized as a remedial statute that should be
broadly construed.”); Frisch’s Rests. v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 651 (6th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Warner Bros., 658 F.2d at 79); F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 214
U.S.P.Q. 409, 416 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is a remedial statute that
must be broadly construed.”); Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging the “the well-established principle that section 43(a) should be broadly
construed”). Based on the broad language of the statute and its broad remedial purpose, it would
be unjust to reject Plaintiffs’ claims.
2.

Under the Fourth Circuit Approach to Determining Standing Under the
Lanham Act, Defendant’s Motion Must be Denied

Defendant’s discussion of the various tests applied in different circuits and attempts to
characterize Plaintiffs’ claims as “typical” Lanham Act allegations, obscure the fact that the
Fourth Circuit takes a much more realistic and fact-based approach to determining standing
under the Lanham Act. In the Fourth Circuit, the touchstone of the analysis of Lanham Act
standing is whether the claimant is trying to protect purely commercial interests against
unscrupulous commercial conduct. Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Foods, Inc., 365 F.3d
278, 280 (4th Cir. 2004). In Made in the USA, a controlling case that Defendant elected to bury
in a footnote, the Fourth Circuit denied standing to a group that represented the interests of
consumers. Id. However, the Court also relied on a First Circuit case holding that a Plaintiff
must have a reasonable interest in being protected from false advertising to have standing and
must therefore “show a link or ‘nexus’ between itself and the alleged falsehood.” Camel Hair &
Cashmere Inst, Inc. v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986).
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In Camel Hair, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff-trade group had standing, even
though neither it nor any of its members were competitors of the defendant, because the plaintiff
had “a strong interest in preserving cashmere’s reputation as a high quality fibre.” 799 F.2d at
12. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit concluded that standing was proper in Camel Hair because
the plaintiff was “suing to protect a commercial interest.” Made in the USA, 365 F.3d at 280.
The Fourth Circuit denied standing in Made in the USA because the plaintiffs were merely
consumers, and no circuit recognizes consumer standing under the Lanham Act. See id. (“At
least half of the circuits hold (and none of the others disagree) that the second of these Lanham
Act provisions, § 45, or 15 U.S.C. § 1127, bars a consumer from suing under the Act.”).
Here, Plaintiffs sell cars, a business where a good reputation and customer trust are
absolutely essential to success. Over 90 years, Plaintiffs built a stellar reputation with customers
and with the true consumer advocates, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs.
Compl. ¶ 10; Nemet Decl. ¶ 4.1 It is crucially important to understand that the NYCDCA
website includes hundreds of complaints about car dealers throughout the New York City area,
but not a single complaint about Plaintiffs. Compl. ¶ 13; Nemet Decl. ¶ 4. Thus, Plaintiffs are
directly harmed when Defendant misleadingly describes itself as a “consumer affairs” website
but irresponsibly solicits, develops, and posts defamatory content, all for the purely commercial
purposes of (a) funneling those defamatory complaints to class action lawyers and (b) attracting
advertising revenue. Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims are clearly intended to protect Plaintiffs’
purely commercial interest in legitimate, honest, and accurate consumer affairs organizations,
and to remedy Plaintiffs’ injuries as a result of Defendant’s misleading commercial use of the
1

The NYCDCA also posts complaints against automobile dealers on its website. None
of those complaints are about Nemet Motors because Nemet Motors provides excellent customer
service and works to resolve the few customer complaints it receives, but some New York
automobile dealers have dozens or even hundreds of complaints posted on the official New York
consumer affairs website for improper business practices.
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“consumer affairs” name. Defendant’s refusal to address or distinguish Camel Hair – endorsed
by the Fourth Circuit in Made in the USA – is tantamount to an admission that Plaintiffs have
standing in this case.
Defendant’s approach to standing in this case is unduly narrow and would lead to absurd
and unintended limitations on the facially broad scope of the Lanham Act. Defendant selfservingly argues that “the parties most likely to be directly affected [by Defendant’s confusing
and misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name] are those governmental agencies responsible
for addressing such complaints.” Def.’s. Br. Supp. Mot. Strike Dismiss 13. Public consumer
affairs agencies have neither the time nor the resources to pursue false advertising claims.
Furthermore, the Lanham Act is intended to provide a remedy for companies that are harmed in
commerce, not for public agencies.
3.

The Multi-Factor Test Applied in Many Circuits Supports Plaintiffs’
Standing to Sue in This Case.

Even if this Court applies the multi-factor test and engages in the factual inquiry
conducted in some circuits, Plaintiffs have standing under the Lanham Act.

Contrary to

Defendant’s misleading arguments, only a minority of the circuits – the Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth -- holds that a plaintiff must be a direct competitor to sue under the Lanham Act. See
Def.’s Br. 11. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (11th
Cir. 2007).2 The Eighth Circuit has not adopted this approach. See Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists v.
Yellow Book USA, Inc., 434 F.3d 1100, 1104 (8th Cir. 2006) (“But we need not resolve what
may be a circuit conflict over the appropriate test for standing . . .”). The First and Second
Circuits apply “a less categorical approach to determine standing, wherein the dispositive issue is
2

“With the exception of the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the courts have held that
the plaintiff and defendants need not always be in direct competition with each other for plaintiff
to have standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 43(a).” 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:32 (4th ed. 1996, supp. 2007).
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not the degree of ‘competition,’ but whether the plaintiff has a ‘reasonable interest’ to be
protected against the type of harm that the Lanham Act is intended to prevent.” Phoenix of
Broward, 489 F.3d at 1165 (citing Camel Hair and Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32
F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1994)). As noted, the Fourth Circuit has previously cited with approval
the First Circuit’s approach to Lanham Act standing, which analysis should control here.
Plaintiffs would also have standing were the Court inclined to apply the test used by the
other circuits. Three circuits – the Third, Fifth, and most recently the Eleventh – have adopted a
multi-factor test developed by the Supreme Court for antitrust cases. See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc.
v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway
Corp., 242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001); Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1163-64 (“…we join the
Third and Fifth Circuits and adopt the test for prudential standing articulated in Conte Bros.”).
This approach is further endorsed by “two prominent commentaries.” Procter & Gamble, 242
F.3d at 562 n.51 (citing MCCARTHY § 27:32 n.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF

UNFAIR

COMPETITION § 3 cmt. f (1995)). Plaintiffs emphasize that the Fourth Circuit has not adopted
this approach and has instead relied on the more flexible analysis conducted in the First and
Second Circuits.
Under the multi-factor approach used by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits:
[T]o determine whether a party has prudential standing to bring a false advertising
claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a court should consider and weigh
the following factors:
(1) The nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury: Is the injury of a type that
Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of
the [Lanham Act]?
(2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.
(3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the alleged injurious
conduct.
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(4) The speculativeness of the damages claim.
(5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning
damages.
Phoenix of Broward, 489 F.3d at 1163-64 (quoting Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233). All of these
factors weigh in favor of standing for Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims against Defendant in this
case, under both Sections 43(a)(1)(A) and 43(a)(1)(B).3
As to the first factor, Plaintiffs have suffered a competitive injury as a result of
Defendant’s misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name to lend legitimacy to unconfirmed,
defamatory complaints about the Plaintiffs.

As a result of Defendant’s misleading use,

Defendant profits by generating class action lawsuits and attracting advertising revenue while
Plaintiffs have suffered lost business and damage to reputation, among other harms. Plaintiffs
are clearly persons engaged in commerce, and the Lanham Act is intended to protect persons in
commerce from the type of false advertising and unfair competition that Defendant is accused of
doing in the Complaint. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. This is the type of injury that the Lanham Act is
intended to remedy.

For all of these reasons, this factor weighs in favor of standing for

Plaintiffs.
As to the second factor, Plaintiffs have described how Defendant’s misuse of the
“consumer affairs” name has directly injured Plaintiffs’ commercial interests. Consumers are
actually misled into thinking that Defendant will help remedy their complaints and do not avail
themselves of legitimate consumer affairs agencies; Plaintiffs have no complaints on the
3

In Conte Brothers, the Third Circuit flatly rejected the argument that standing under
Section 43(a) should depending on the type of claim alleged: false advertising or false
designation of origin. “Section 43(a) provides no support for drawing a distinction in standing
depending on the type of § 43(a) violation alleged. The operative language that provides for
standing – ‘any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged’ – does not
purport to distinguish between the two types of actions available under § 43(a).” 165 F.3d at
232.
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legitimate consumer affairs agency website of the NYCDCA. Compl. ¶ 13; Nemet Decl. ¶ 4. As
a direct consequence of Defendant’s misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name, consumers
who are misled or confused may refuse to do business with Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have and
will continue to lose business and suffer damage to their reputation among customers. See
Compl. ¶ 36. The second factor also weighs in favor of standing for Plaintiffs.
As to the third factor, the Court should ask whether there is an “identifiable class” of
persons “whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest by
bringing suit.” Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 234. As discussed above, Defendant would have this
Court hold that the only parties who have standing to sue this Defendant under the Lanham Act
are the legitimate consumer affairs agencies or organizations. Under this perverse argument, the
“identifiable class” has no conceivable commercial reason to challenge Defendant’s misleading
use of the “consumer affairs” name. The persons with the strongest self-interest in stopping
Defendant’s misleading use are the consumers who are being misled (but who do not have
standing under the Lanham Act) and the commercial businesses that are being harmed by
Defendant’s misconduct. As a commercial entity with a stellar reputation that works hard to
resolve the few consumer complaints it receives, and as an entity that has no complaints posted
on the honest and legitimate consumer affairs website in New York City, Plaintiffs have the
strongest self-interest in ensuring that Defendant’s misleading, for-profit misuse of the
“consumer affairs” name is stopped as soon as possible. The third factor also weighs in favor of
standing for Plaintiffs.
As to the fourth factor, Plaintiffs damages are concrete, not speculative. Plaintiffs allege
to have lost business as a result of Defendant’s misleading use of the “consumer affairs” name,
which is exacerbated by the false and defamatory content that Defendant places on its website.
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At this stage in the litigation, these allegations should be accepted as true. The fourth factor
weighs in favor of standing for Plaintiffs.
Finally, as to the fifth factor, there is no danger of duplicative damages, or complexity in
apportioning damages, as to either claim. It would not be difficult for this Court to apportion
damages among the four counts in this case, and the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek against
Defendant’s misuse of the “consumer affairs” name would not be duplicative in any event. This
factor also weighs in favor of standing for Plaintiffs.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court should deny the
Motion to Dismiss in its entirety and direct Defendant to answer the Complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
__________/s/_ _______________
Benjamin G. Chew (VSB#29113)
Andrew M. Friedman
Counsel for Plaintiffs Nemet Chevrolet Ltd.
and Thomas Nemet, d/b/a Nemet Motors
PATTON BOGGS LLP
2550 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
Telephone: (202) 457-6000
Facsimile: (202) 457-6315
bchew@pattonboggs.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of April, 2008, I will electronically file the
foregoing PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR
STRIKE COMPLAINT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a
notification of such filing (NEF) to Defendant’s counsel, as follows:

Jonathan D. Frieden, Esquire (VSB No. 41452)
Sean P. Roche, Esquire (VSB No. 71412)
ODIN, FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN, P.C.
9302 Lee Highway, Suite 1100
Fairfax, Virginia 22031
(703) 218-2100
(703) 218-2160 (facsimile)
jonathan.frieden@ofplaw.com

__________/s/_ _______________
Benjamin G. Chew

